Major Bilateral Issues between China and India | OMICS International
INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS - DOCUMENTS Nepal–India and Nepal –China Relations–– Documents—Five Volumes. 6. India's Foreign. The People's Republic of China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship since it been more evident since , leading the two sides to discuss China—and. Find India China Relations Latest News, Videos & Pictures on India China Relations and see latest updates, news, information from dayline.info Explore more on India China India, China relations complex: Shashi Tharoor Sep 16,
Economic stability and profit are the main motives for China and India to work together. The agreement was one of thirteen trade pacts signed between India and China during the official visit and provides an institutional and legal framework for increased foreign investment flows between the two sides. India and China also agreed to encourage cooperation in oilfield bidding and exploration and the development of hydrocarbons in third countries. India drills the oil and China provides the infrastructure by building the pipe lines.
His expectation is that if India and China join together they would resolve global challenges, such as climate change or energy issues. They are both two of the biggest oil consumers. If they work together they could put great pressure on the oil producing countries. And if both get together they could also put more pressure on the G7 states. In the business world the term is often used for the possible synergies in the IT sector or business in general, where China produces the hardware manufacturing and India provides the software service.
Some Indian software companies like Satyam and Wipro have already set up shop in China. India fears that China wants to challenge its position of a global software exporter and China fears India could become a major manufacturing hub. Only a labour-intensive mass production can incorporate the growing numbers of employable young Indians in the future.
Multilateral engagement with mistrust Bilateral relations between India and China after the war in have been ambivalent.
The same can be said about the relationship of both countries in multilateral forums. China and India often join forces when it comes to oppose demands from western, developed countries.
In climate policy, China and India signed a five year agreement in October to jointly fight climate change and to negotiate international climate deals using common positions.
Major Bilateral Issues between China and India
This agreement was made prior to the UN climate change summit in Copenhagen in December China and India together, both members of G20, consistently argue that developing countries should not be required to set and meet the same targets for reducing greenhouse gases as developed countries who carry a greater historical responsibility for the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases.
This was unacceptable for China and India, as they saw this as an attempt by Western powers to undermine their fast economic development. They rejected calls by developed nations to set legally binding targets, and both countries signed a modified Copenhagen Accord afterward in March On the economic arena China and India together did not consent to a bilateral Free Trade Agreement FTA yet because of fears of the Indian industry that it would not be be able to compete with cheap Chinese imports.
China backed India's stand. Although this mutual support drew widespread criticism from not only developed countries but also from Brazil, the joint position of the two neighbouring countries has continued ever since.
Whalley and Shekhar Tanmaya China and India tried to keep each other out of their respective denominations to contain greater regional influence by the other. Pakistan follows a similar strategy against its stronger foe India by trying to internationalize the Kashmir issue while India tries to argue that Kashmir is solely an internal or at the most bilateral issue. But still, understanding in the multilateral field has not improved bilateral relations: Kondapalli condemns this doctrine strongly: The result is that we have not seen the crucial bilateral problems being resolved.
Cooperation without trust: India-China relations today | Heinrich Böll Stiftung India
This kind of activities makes India suspicious. So we see, that the multilateral cooperation has not impacted the bilateral relations.
With the result that there is mutual distrust. Lack of scholars and people who can understand the other side For building up trust, understanding and knowledge is very important — in everyday life as in international relations. As regards China, India's knowledge about the neighbouring country and one of the great powers of the current world order is appallingly low, as shown by the small number of scholars and experts on China.
Kondapalli estimates that the number of Chinese experts in India does not surpass the number of Most of them have their academic background from other fields, such as American or Russian Studies, and shifted their expertise to China later on, after China moved more into the global spotlight.
For a country like India which has unresolved border issues with China and went to war because of this inthe lack of capacity to deal with China is astonishing. It remains difficult to understand why a hostile conflict in the past and greater business interests nowadays have not more increased the demand for people who can understand the other side.
In the governments of both countries signed a Cultural Exchange Program. As part of this agreement every year 28 Indian students were invited to China and 28 Chinese students were send to India. Students could be from any subject and could attend any university. Kondapalli went to China to learn Chinese in What happens when you learn a language and start to understand the other side is best described in Prof. And it was amazing. But after the to language training you are kind of charged up, you can jump around and you can talk to people.
Kondapallis time as a researcher in Yan'an shows: I generally had my food in a restaurant outside the city. One day the hotel owner asked me where I was from.
As I answered that I was from India, he told me that he participated in the war. So, he showed me some guns he owned from that time. That was my first incident where I met somebody from China with a connection to the war. But, he did not do that to offend me, he just wanted to show that he had some link to India.
After we have talked, he cooked dog meat for me, as a special treat. That was the first time I ever ate dog, and probably the last time laughing. She might represent a changing attitude among the public and scholars towards China — an attitude more open minded and less affected by the Indian experience of defeat in the war. The post liberalization generation of Indians is driven more by practical economic interests and, for those who can afford it economically, by a growing curiosity for deepening knowledge about other cultures and countries.
China is emerging as an affordable and popular place for aspiring India doctors. Since 60 to Indian students are placed in Chinese medical colleges each year in order to pursue their MBBS, and the numbers will grow further Bhattacharyya The delegation consisted of women leaders like Jyotsna Chatterji, environmentalist like Avanti Metha, journalists and political leaders.
Ms Bhavna Singh and the Indian delegation, as representatives of education, politics and NGOs from a democratic country with civic liberties, realized that there is much to learn from the Chinese government-organized NGOs. First of all, in her view, the manner of operation is superior compared to India. The Chinese get a lot of funding from governmental and non- governmental sources. In that sense they have a lot of capacity. But it is not only the money. At the implementation level, even though India also has a quite a lot of capacity, India's organizations perform very weakly compared to China.
That might not only be because of the bureaucratic hurdles faced by Indian NGOs. Indian NGOs are most of the times totally independent from government and business bodies. If an organization wants to implement an agenda it has to follow a sometimes frustrating process of consensus building with different political, business and social interest groups.
In China, the organisational and management structure is different. In China, consensus does not emerge as a process of conflict resolution from the bottom, but instead is reached by following the guidelines of the party or government policies. That's why in China, the agenda of NGOs is most of the times already conform with government policies, so that the process of implementation doesn't meet many obstacles.
They have already put forward a request to government officials to start such cooperation. But there is a structural problem the Chinese have to face if they want to make such initiatives work: So they have to go to every NGO individually and ask for some kind of cooperation. In that sense it will become a little more difficult for them, because their way of conduct is more organized, more streamlined, more disciplined, and in that sense not so complicated as in India.
The process to look for cooperation with Indian NGOs has just started. The Chinese side plans to send a delegation every year to filter out individuals who might help them to start interacting with Indian NGOs.
Avanti Metha for instance, an environmentalist who works alternatively in Mumbai and Delhi and was part of the Indian delegation in China, is involved in a lot of environment based issues and various agencies.
The Chinese expect her to assist them to create networks with Indian environmental organizations and also to support them to promote their agenda to Indian government bodies and NGOs. But the motivation for partnering with Indian NGOs is much bigger on the Chinese than on the Indian side, a result of the general strains in the bilateral relationship which also affects civil society actors on both sides.[Lecture] China-India Relations In A Changing World
Ms Bhavna Singh assumes that because of the lack of mutual trust in the political sphere the two neighbouring countries also do not go comfortably with each other in other fields. The language problem is certainly one factor because a lot of nuances are lost in translation. That makes working together difficult because very often both sides end up not to include the things they originally wanted to include in their agenda. On the official level it is also difficult to get clearances from both sides.
But even if the Chinese want to be the first to fund projects in India, they will be met with a lot of distrust. People would ask why a particular Chinese organization wants to invest or fund somebody in India. There is a qualitative difference for somebody who wants to pursue Indian Studies in China: The Chinese on the other hand have some experts in the Sanskrit language, and even a few experts in South Indian languages.
Their interest has most of the times to do with Buddhist scriptures which had an impact on the traditional Chinese society. So, almost all classical Buddhist scripture are already translated into modern Chinese.
India needs a new approach towards China The call for a new strategy or approach towards China is not a new one Banerjee But India needs to react now to foster peaceful relations on an equal basis with China. The educational and the economic sector are paving the way for better relations.
With the growing capacity in university exchange programs and business relations also personal relationships can grow. On a personal, individual level trust between the two countries is growing. India's main problem in improving relations to China is partly due to the lack of political will from the government to change the status quo with Chine, due to vested interests from different political groups, industry and probably military.
But it is partially also due to the current state of political and civic culture in India. Most importantly, the media in India show a tendency to exaggerate and monger for sensations.
The way popular Indian TV News Channels present news, as well as the discussion culture in talk shows, do not help to create a culture of common courtesy and trust or simply inform the public. In the case of China, media show a bias against China most of the time, looking at the neighbouring country primarily as a threat to India's sovereignty. This argumentation is certainly not completely wrong; India has to keep a watchful eye on China because the border conflict is still pending and Chinese military power and influence in India's geo-strategic territory is increasing.
China's relationship with Pakistan is definitely an effort to counter India's growing geo-political ambitions. But a comparison between Indian relationships to Pakistan and those to China shows that the chances for positive change are much higher with China. Since the war and the border clashes in Sikkim not a single shot was fired between India and China. At the Indo-Pakistan border there is frequent exchange of artillery fire, terrorists are sneaking in, and then there is border trespassing by military jets and personnel.
Additionally the element of ideology is much stronger in relation with Pakistan than with China. Such an element is totally missing in the relations with China.
China is a far more rational competitor and therefore much easier to deal with than Pakistan. Only India sometime seems to act irrational when it comes to China. India has to cast off its inferiority complex when it has to face China.
The country seems to have forgotten its old strengths when it comes to its authoritarian neighbour. At the time of Sino-Indian border conflict, the India's Communist Party was accused by the Indian government as being pro-PRC, and a large number of its political leaders were jailed.
Relations between the PRC and India deteriorated during the rest of the s and the early s while the China—Pakistan relations improved and the Sino-Soviet relations worsened. Between andan all-weather road was built across territory claimed by India, linking PRC's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan; India could do no more than protest. The PRC continued an active propaganda campaign against India and supplied ideological, financial, and other assistance to dissident groups, especially to tribes in northeastern India.
Sri Lanka played the role of chief negotiator for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Indian territory. Both countries agreed to Colombo's proposals. On 11 September, Chinese troops opened fire on a detachment of Indian soldiers tasked with protecting an engineering company that was fencing the North Shoulder of Nathu La.
This escalated over the next five days to an exchange of heavy artillery and mortar fire between the Indian and Chinese forces. Sixty-two Indian soldiers were killed. On 1 Octobersome Indian and Chinese soldiers had an argument over the control of a boulder at the Chola outpost in Sikkim then a protectorate of Indiatriggering a fight that escalated to a mortar and heavy machine gun duel. While Indian forces would sustain eighty-eight troops killed in action with another troops wounded, China would suffer less casualties, with 32 killed and 91 wounded in Nathu Laas well as forty in Chola.
Although China strongly condemned India, it did not carry out its veiled threat to intervene on Pakistan's behalf. Inthe Indian Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a landmark visit to Beijing, and both countries officially re-established diplomatic relations in The PRC modified its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir and appeared willing to remain silent on India's absorption of Sikkim and its special advisory relationship with Bhutan.
The PRC's leaders agreed to discuss the boundary issue, India's priority, as the first step to a broadening of relations. The two countries hosted each other's news agencies, and Mount Kailash and Mansarowar Lake in Tibet, the mythological home of the Hindu pantheonwere opened to annual pilgrimages. India also undertook infrastructural development in disputed areas. In the winter ofthe Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team could arrive and built a Helipad at Wandung.
Sundarjiairlifted a brigade to the region.
Cooperation without trust: India-China relations today
However, Indian foreign minister N. In the PRC insisted on mutual concessions without defining the exact terms of its "package proposal" or where the actual line of control lay. In andthe negotiations achieved nothing, given the charges exchanged between the two countries of military encroachment in the Sumdorung Chu Valley. China's construction of a military post and helicopter pad in the area in and India's grant of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh formerly the North-East Frontier Agency in February caused both sides to deploy troops to the area.
The PRC relayed warnings that it would "teach India a lesson" if it did not cease "nibbling" at Chinese territory. By the summer ofhowever, both sides had backed away from conflict and denied military clashes had taken place. A warming trend in relations was facilitated by Rajiv Gandhi 's visit to China in December India and the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute.
Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, establish direct air links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on economic and scientific co-operation, and a joint working group on the boundary issue.
The latter group was to be led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs. Progress was also made in reducing tensions on the border via mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders, and advance notification about military exercises.
Consulates reopened in Bombay Mumbai and Shanghai in December InThe sixth-round of the joint working group talks was held in New Delhi but resulted in only minor developments.
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed a border agreement dealing with cross-border trade, cooperation on environmental issues e.