Harper's turnaround: PM says he felt he had to extend Afghan mission - The Globe and Mail
Canada to End Combat Role in Afghanistan at End of announcement on Tuesday came days before a NATO summit meeting in Lisbon. Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan We'll call the meeting to order. Today we have the .. By the end of April , senior officials in Ottawa did accept the embassy's recommendations from April 24 and On May 3. The last Canadians involved in the NATO training mission in . Your comments will be pre-moderated and published if they meet netiquette guidelines. One comment on “Canada's year Afghan mission ends”. Edward.
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Evidence - AFGH () - No. 15 - House of Commons of Canada
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Even beforehe had become deeply disillusioned with president Hamid Karzai and unconvinced the Afghan institutions we were backing would endure. In my strong view, we were wrong to leave the NATO mission and wrong not to champion a tougher approach toward Pakistan much earlier. The end result today is increasingly indefensible; despite all the lip service paid in Canada to peacekeeping, our country and France remain the only NATO member states without a single soldier in Afghanistan—a UN-mandated chapter VII mission.
After leading support for Afghan-led national solutions benefiting the whole population—a development-assistance best practice—Canada lost its strategic vision. The blue-ribbon Manley Commission recommended in a new form of investment.
But the change was cosmetic; signature projects with maple leaves were not what was needed to restore Afghan faith in government.
Canada’s 12-year Afghan mission ends
This was a failing military intervention: The failure to deliver these last two elements robbed Afghans of the outcome we had all committed to achieve. Did we use our larger effort and sacrifice as an excuse to leave early?
Was this a responsible approach for a country that has consistently championed alliances, multilateral effort, and international law? To his credit, professor Nossal published a prize-winning paper on the inability of Canadians to grasp the regional realpolitik undermining the mission.
The three greatest setbacks in Afghanistan have all been due to Anglo-American mistakes: The paltry sums spent by Canada, Italy, the U. Bagram, a district capital just sixty kilometres north of Kabul, had a Hindu Kamboja ruler in the third century BCE and was a summer capital for Kushan emperors in the first century CE; a Bagh-e Ram, or garden of Ram, testified to Hindu and Buddhist influence.
In the s, an airport was built there, where Dwight Eisenhower, the first U. In the s, Bagram was a principal Soviet military hub. As the number of detainees ballooned, so too did allegations of abuse, punctuated by two deaths in December In very short order, Bagram became shorthand for detention without charge or trial; denial of International Committee of the Red Cross access and monitoring; and total information blackout— in other words, a revocation of many key principles of the law of armed conflict.
One of my jobs at the United Nations—certainly among the most dispiriting—was to lead a team that documented these abuses, which made it much harder to portray the Taliban as the brutal belligerents who showed no respect for human life.
Many Pakistanis now disagree with their government as these failed policies tip their country further into dictatorship and the prospect of another IMF bailout. But they have little scope to influence policy in the face of rigged elections; murders, executions, and disappearances of political opponents and journalists; and mass censorship. With Russia and Syria facing tough sanctions for lesser crimes, and Iran under renewed pressure for spinning webs of terror, intelligent people need to stop making excuses for state sponsors of terror and start speaking out and doing more to stop them.
With the right incentives and leadership, it is still reasonable to expect that one day Pakistan will awaken and forge an enduring settlement with its long-suffering neighbour to the west. Most of us disregard the extent to which our early wars—from the long Anglo-French conflict to the War of —forged our national identity and shaped institutions we still cherish.
At Vimy, Amiens, and in the Hundred Days offensive, too—whose centenary we celebrate this fall—we won an independent voice for Canada on the world stage, which we pledged to use in the cause of an even wider peace. This legacy was sealed by the Second World War.
Successful military campaigns to prevent a Communist takeover of the Korean Peninsula, or secure peace in Bosnia and Kosovo, have only enhanced our military reputation, as has our refusal to take part in misguided wars in Vietnam and Iraq.
But to make peace, strategic cynicism must yield to strategic impatience backed by the right regional approach. Do we believe the rules underpinning our own peace and prosperity—security from external attack within sovereign borders—apply to poor countries, as well as rich ones?
Regular forces arrived in Kandahar during January—February Army units during Operation Anaconda. In the operation the team broke, and re-broke, the kill record for a long distance sniper kill set in the Vietnam War by a U.
Canada in the War in Afghanistan
Marine, Staff Sergeant Carlos Hathcock. Other forces in the country provided garrison and security troops. The soldiers were conducting night-time training on a designated live-fire range, and the American pilots mistook their gunfire for a Taliban insurgent attack.
Four Canadians were killed and eight were wounded in the friendly fire incident. Their deaths were the first Canadian deaths in Afghanistan, and the first in a combat zone since the Korean War.
No coalition troops were killed or wounded during the attack. Operation Athena[ edit ] In Augustthe Canadian Forces moved to the northern city of Kabul where it became the commanding nation of the newly formed International Security Assistance Force. Canada dubbed this Operation Athena and a 1,strong Canadian task force provided assistance to civilian infrastructure such as well-digging and repair of local buildings.
The truth of Canada's failure in Afghanistan | Literary Review of Canada
Stage one of Operation Athena ended in December and the fulfillment of the stated aim of "rebuilding the democratic process" in Afghanistan.
This plays a huge part in the war in Afghanistan.
In preparations, "soldiers needed to know as much as possible about local customs, culture, and politics, and about the nature and motivation of groups that might oppose the establishment of peace and order. In training for the mission the goal in Afghanistan was clear: Operation Archer[ edit ] Canadian soldiers fire an M mm Howitzer field artillery gun at Taliban fighting positions near the Sangin District Center.
Operation Archer followed Athena beginning in February By the spring ofCanada had a major role in southern Afghanistan, with Task Force Afghanistan being a battle group of 2, soldiers based at Kandahar. Canada also commanded the Multi-National Brigade for Command South, a main military force in the region. In Maythe Canadian government extended Canadian military commitments to Afghanistan by two years, replacing earlier plans to withdraw soldiers in Additionally, Foreign Affairs Canada stated that the commitment was more than just military, employing a "whole of government approach", in which a Provincial Reconstruction Team PRTutilizing personnel from the military, Foreign Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Policewould provide a dual role of security as well as reconstruction of the country and political structure.
Taliban resurgence[ edit ] Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team PRT during a patrol When the Canadian Forces returned to Kandahar after being deployed to Kabul inthe Taliban began a major offensive, and the Canadians were caught in the middle. After a spring in which a record number of attacks against Canadian soldiers had been set, which included six deaths to the CF, the Taliban in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces were massing.
Operation Mountain Thrust was launched in the beginning of the summer in Complex mud-walled compounds made the rural Panjwaii District take on an almost urban style of fighting in some places.
Daily firefights, artillery bombardments, and allied airstrikes turned the tides of the battle in favour of the Canadians. After Operation Mountain Thrust came to an end, Taliban fighters flooded back into the Panjwaii District in numbers that had not been seen yet in a single area in the "post Anaconda" war.
Canadians launched Operation Medusa in September in an attempt to clear the areas of Taliban fighters from Panjwaii once and for all. The fighting of Operation Medusa led the way to the second, and most fierce Battle of Panjwaii in which daily gun-battles, ambushes, and mortar and rocket attacks were targeting the Canadian troops.