Bay of Pigs invasion | Summary, Significance, & Facts | dayline.info
The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, In early President John F. Kennedy concluded that Fidel Castro was a Soviet client working to. Finally, in April , the CIA launched what its leaders believed would be the In May , Castro established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and In , the Cuban missile crisis inflamed American-Cuban-Soviet tensions. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had Two actions also signaled a warming in relations between the superpowers: Visit our online exhibit: World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy greets President Eisenhower at Camp David, 22 April
After the transmission of nuclear missiles, Khrushchev had finally established mutually assured destruction. Mutually assured destruction means that if America decided to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR, the latter would react by launching a nuclear strike against America.
According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire". Prior to this, there was no clear barrier to how the United States was willing to react, and with new president John F. Kennedy, it was unknown to the Soviet Union to what they can do to manipulate the United States.
Cuban Missile Crisis - HISTORY
By placing missiles on Cuba, next to the doorstep of the United States, it would be clear to the extent of which the United States would react.
They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba.
According to another source, Castro objected to the missiles deployment that would have made him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp.
By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists, especially in Latin America.
He said he wanted to confront the Americans "with more than words From the very beginning, the Soviets' operation entailed elaborate denial and deceptionknown as " maskirovka ".
Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment.
The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Seaand Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District and a bomber base in the far eastern region.
All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences.
Bay of Pigs Invasion
He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature.
On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Russian-built MiG fighters and Il light bombers. CIA director John A. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, "made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States.
He charged the Kennedy administration of covering up a major threat to the US, thereby starting the crisis. The R was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ.
The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles.
Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missiles could turn. The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese -operated U-2   was lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile.
Bay of Pigs invasion
The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the "Photo Gap. US officials attempted to use a Corona photoreconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence.
When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying. Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery. McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of the images.
Stern, head of the Kennedy library transcribed some of them. The US had no plan in place because its intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. Johnson was a member, quickly discussed several possible courses of action: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new. Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles.
Offer Castro the choice of splitting with the Russians or being invaded. Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro. Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites. Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba. As the article describes, both the US and the Soviet Union considered many possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis Allison, Graham T.
This game tree models how both actors would have considered their decisions. It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the US from conquering Cuba. They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing.
If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin. Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5, strategic warheads, : McNamara concluded that the Soviets having would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. Aerial view of missile launch site at San Cristobal, Cuba. Kennedy Library After the failed U.
Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U. Despite the warning, on October 14 a U. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.
The President decided upon a middle course. That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.
The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.
With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
- Cuban Missile Crisis
On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate. That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island.
It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day.