Logic and Ethics
The relationship between psychology and ethics is determined by whether psychology is conceptualized as a natural or a human science. Answer: People would like to think that there is a relationship between logic and ethics. i.e. what is moral is also what is rational. But in reality, the relationship is. Both recognize the ethics of logic apart from the ideal; the logic of ethics makes the ideal practical. liberty have their ethical counterparts in the relationship.
They both provide people guidelines of what may do or what may not do in certain situations. In a word, they exist in a purpose of making people benefit from being members of a well-regulated society.
Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics
Differences between ethics and laws: However, there are many distinctions between ethics and laws. To some extent, ethics is not well defined but laws are defined and precise. Ethics can also be distinguished by looking at whether people are being punished after they violate the rules. Nobody will be punished when they violate ethics; but whoever violates laws is going to receive punishment carried out by relevant authorities. On the one hand, ethical behavior is discrete; it cannot be immediately conceived as continuous experience no one can consistently and continuously adjust his behavior to a formal rule.
The essential of a thing — the character of it — is the unity of the manifold therein contained.
Id est, the logical principle, from which as major premises the facts thereof can be deduced. They therefore do not compose his character, but the general expression of the facts — the acts of his soul — does. It is foolish for him to try to do it; he would be no better man for doing it since the character makes a man.
The Very Law of the Growth of Character is contained in the character. XXXVI When a man begins to be hard pressed with his own passion and power, he sees the nonsense of guiding his conduct by any rule of God or man and the necessity there is of excogitating a manner of life of his own. The next paragraph of this same section discusses the set of basic conceptions of this synthetical unity, i. Translated into Kantian language, this short note says that whereas the synthesis of the manifold in intuition i.
It often happens that someone propounds his views with such positive and uncompromising assurance that he seems to have entirely set aside all thought of possible error.
A bet disconcerts him. Sometimes it turns out that he has a conviction which can be estimated at a value of one ducat, but not of ten. For he is very willing to venture one ducat, but when it is a question of ten he becomes aware, as he had not previously been, that it may very well be that he is in error. If, in a given case, we represent ourselves as staking the happiness of our whole life, the triumphant tone of our judgment is greatly abated; we become extremely diffident, and discover for the first time that our belief does not reach so far.
Thus pragmatic belief always exists in some specific degree, which, according to differences in the interests at stake, may be large or may be small.
Kantian pure reflective judgment brings knowledge and moral conduct together, and in doing so, it relies neither on practical nor on theoretical pre-existent rules, but creates them anew. But, on the other hand, it cannot, as it is, provide any justification or guarantee for a choice of an end. Peirce, therefore, unlike Kant, holds that the universal validity of such end remains only a matter of rational hope.
Thus, Peirce agrees with Kant on the role of aesthetics, but not on the way it can be shown that the ends it provides are objectively valid. According to Kant, aesthetic judgment is justified as a universally valid because it is the only possible symbolic link between an object of freedom and an object of nature. These papers, although much different in terms of style and intention, implicitly ask one and the same question: If a genius, unlike an ordinary man, is the one who, in Kantian terms, has the aesthetic-based power to see a given totality of understanding as a law of Reason, what are the results of this power with respect to morality?
In his late recollections Peirce himself more or less precisely defined the timeframe of this diversion: This may be read to mean that it is at some time toward the end of this period i. For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject.
That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to my self the identity of the consciousness in [i.
In other words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity. The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine.
For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. KRV, B; emphasis added Peirce: If we had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to unity, and would therefore not need to be thought of as referred to an interpretant, and the conception of reference to an interpretant would not arise.
But since there is a manifold of impressions, we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which leads us to differentiate this impression from that, and then, having been differentiated, they require to be brought to unity.
Now they are not brought to unity until we conceive them together as being ours, that is, until we refer them to a conception as their interpretant. Thus, the reference to an interpretant arises upon the holding together of diverse impressions, and therefore it does not join a conception to the substance, as the other two references do, but unites directly the manifold of the substance itself. It is, therefore, the last conception in order in passing from being to substance.
In contrast, the Peircean pattern of interpreting, unlike self-consciousness, unites all other notions in a general idea in that it correlates them to something else in such a way as to give rise to the notion of representation: I represent something the correlation of which to something else is the only guarantee of its comprehensiveness. The continuous act of correlation necessarily refers any given expression to its future conceived interpretations.
Reinterpreting these sections, Peirce makes the possibility of knowledge dependent on the synthesis of impressions taken as a process explicable in its principle details. It acquires cognitive value through a set of modes of reference — quality, relation and representation, and their corresponding kinds of signification: These forms of mediating reference constitute consecutive steps to cover a logical distance between the multitude of impressions and a concept.
The interpretant simply allows us to grasp the impressions as ours, thus replacing Kantian synthesis of apperception in self-consciousness with the idea of an intersubjective synthesis of meaning ApelCh. Like Hegel, Peirce interprets Kantian synthesis not as a pure self-positing Selbst-Bestimmungbut as a process of interpretation, or continuous development.
Of course, like most logic riddles these are far-fetched and contrived, but that is necessary to keep people from knowing or arguing about the content of more realistic problems, where they may have either knowledge that does not require reasoning or where they think they do. Logic is about deducing what we don't know directly from what we do know already.
If we could know everything directly, we would not need to use logic. That is why it is seductive to think that if we just learn enough facts, we won't need to know logic or how to reason. But we usually can't come to know all the facts we might need or want, and are then left to have to deduce them.
When we play poker, you know what is in your own hand, by looking at it. You don't have to deduce what cards you already have. But since you don't know directly what is in the other players' hands without cheating, you have to use logic based on knowing the odds of different hands, which cards have been played that they then cannot have, and possibly their betting quirks and telltale signs, to deduce what they likely have.
And when people are asked to reason about something with which they have some familiarity, and they get it right, it is difficult to tell when they are reasoning for themselves and making deductions versus when they are just saying what they already know or believe. So if you give the correct answer to it, it does not show you can reason.
However, if after the answer was explained to you, you still could not answer it correctly, that might be a sign you cannot reason. It would explain, for example, why when evidence is given about the fatal flaws in any regulation or policy, that is not sufficient to get those in charge of those regulations or policies to change or rescind it. For example, it is fast becoming widespread medical insurance practice not to pay doctors or hospitals for patients whose problems recur or need additional follow up treatment because that is claimed to be a sign they were not treated correctly the first time, which was already paid.
And as one doctor put it, apparently it would be a sign of successful treatment if the patient just dies, since then there would be no recurring health problems or necessary follow-up medical treatments.
But the policy is not changed. By the way, sacrcasm, satire, and cynicism of that sort, based on logic, does no good for changing the minds of logipaths for two reasons: They can see it mocks them, but they don't know why, and think it is just because the person presenting it simply disagrees with their views and is being arrogant or condescending about it. Instead of being educated or persuaded to change through such logic, they are merely offended. Lack of basic reasoning ability explains why businesses and other institutions have many really stupid policies and rules, and why those are not changed when they are shown to be stupid.
Instead some formal procedure is pointed to that makes them legitimately instituted and thus "perfectly reasonable" to logipaths. For many people, being reasonable just means following the rules, and the rules are reasonable if they were passed by the proper procedure according to the rules for making rules and policy. My college degree is in philosophy, and when the International Baccalaureate diploma became available in some local high schools, one of the courses in it is "Theory of Knowledge" which is basically a philosophy course.
The Relation of Ethics to Psychology, Logic, Sociology and Economics
I called the State Board of Education to find out what it would take to become certified to teach it, given that I already had an MA in philosophy. Could I just take some education courses? I was told no, that would not be sufficient. In order to teach a philosophy type of course in a high school, you need an education certificate in Social Studies, and philosophy courses don't count toward a degree in social studies, so I would basically have to start from scratch to get a degree in education with a social science major.
I could not teach a philosophy course with a degree in philosophy, but I could teach it with a degree in social studies which has nothing to do with philosophy, any social studies field. And I then distilled it in that manner for the person telling me the regulations, who agreed that was an accurate charcterization of the policy, and when I said "And I'll bet that makes perfectly good sense to you, doesn't it?
Supervisors in business, government, and in medicine, and superior officers in the military, often make terrible decisions and policies, and those too often result in the loss of life through reckless disregard for product or per personnel's safety and human life think Ford Pinto, for examplenot to mention vast amounts of wasted, unpaid, or robbed labor that is the ultimate result of poor financial decisions.
The catastrophic loss of the space shuttle Challenger was an example of poor reasoning by management. Engineers warned administrators that the fuel seals might not hold in the extreme, unseasonably cold temperatures occurring at launch time in Florida that morning.
They begged for the launch to be postponed till the temperatures were much warmer. Administrators said there was no evidence of such danger. But there was no such evidence only because tests had not been conducted at such low temperatures that were never expected to happen at the launch site, and the managers ignored evidence based on theoretical understanding of the properties of the materials involved. Here is a supremely sophisticated, complex engineering project, run by administrators who ignore the warnings of engineers.
And they do that when the price of postponement is paltry compared with the cost of catastrophe. Surely this displays a total lack of reasoning ability, not just some uncharacteristic mistake or understandable occasional human error in judgment. It also explains why form and traditional or standard procedure, and "business as usual" or as it is extrapolated by mere intuition without much logical reasoning that it should be doneoften take precedence over substance and results or consequences.
It is only when someone or something important to somebody in a higher position of authority or when overwhelmingly sufficient people protest that the results are a sign of mismanagement, that consequences begin to matter and policies get ostensibly examined and possibly changed though still, often notor people fired or prosecuted though again, often not. The view is that if the rules or standard procedures or some freely associated approximation to them are followed, nothing can go wrong, and if something does go wrong, it is not because of the rules or following them.
That there could be something wrong with properly instituted rules, makes no sense to those without basic reasoning skills.
And the admonition is always if you "don't like" the rules as if it is not about problems with the rules, but about whether enough people like the rules or notyou should work to get them changed, rather than breaking them, no matter how bad the consequences for others usually would be in following them. Following rules and standard procedures is a poor substitute for understanding, particularly moral understanding, but many people simply don't know the difference or that there is a difference.
This was taken a step further in Major League Baseball's ruling on the clearly mistaken umpire call that cost Detroit pitcher Armando Galarraga a perfect game on the last out when a runner was called safe at first, and instant replay showed him clearly out.
The umpire, Jim Joyce, saw the replay later and tearfully apologized to Galarraga afterward for his terrible mistake. But baseball doesn't have a rule to allow instant replay, and the commissioner's office used that excuse not to reverse the call. I don't think they need one for this because they are not understanding their own rule already in place that governs it: No player, manager, coach or substitute shall object to any such judgment decisions.
Is Being Logical the Same as Being Ethical?
In such cases, someone's decision has to count and so the "judgment" of the umpire is relied upon and is final, even if it may be arbitrary or unable to be known to be mistaken.
But when even the umpire admits he was mistaken, and every baseball fan who saw the game or the news reports and replay later knows the call was wrong, it seems most irrational to say the call has to stand, even though reversing it would affect nothing other than the 27th and 28th batters' batting averages negligibly, and would give Galarraga the significant credit for the amazing and rare performance of pitching a perfect game that he deserves.
In football, the precedence of "judgment call" is preserved even with the instant replay rules, in that it takes conclusive evidence in the replays to override the call on the field by the official.
And part of the significance of that is when replay evidence is inconclusive from all angles, meaning there is likely no possible way to tell what actually happened, whichever way the referee judged it will be the call. Had the official called it the other way, that would have been what stood. Those are the kinds of cases where what is in some sense the arbitrariness or luck of the call can and should stand, simply because that arbitrariness and luck cannot be avoided.
But in cases where the evidence is definitive, it is bizarre to say one has to still consider it a judgment call, and that the mistake needs to be officially accepted as correct.
Some television commentators added that part of the wonder and beauty of baseball is that it has a history of human error, and should not be changed in that way. Good thing these people are not in charge of medical progress, making pronouncements like 'the beauty of the history of medicine is that lots of people died in the past of things we could cure now if we chose to, but we shouldn't choose to do that and spoil such a wonderful tradition.
And it explains why people give lame reasons as long as they can argue they are true. So instead, other means besides logic are employed to persuade politicians, such as marches in the street, large rallies, poll survey results, huge petition drives, visible political pressure in large numbers, donors threatening to cut off campaign contributions or promising to make very generous ones, etc.
In such cases, politicians and elected officials follow public opinion, no matter which way it goes, rather than helping lead and shape it through reasonable explanations to their constituents about what is right and why, given the best possible evidence. The only politicians immune to public opinion are those locked in to an ideological position, but those positions tend to be impervious to logic and rational argument also.
In many cases, politicians' beliefs, based simply on likes and dislikes or on feelings of what is right, simply are the same as the majority of their voting constituents, and what gets them elected is not the logic of either the constitutent or the candidate, but the fact that the candidate can articulate or express the beliefs of those constituents in a way that allows them to feel well-represented by him or her.
And that may help to explain why the Supreme Court so far has equated or confused campaign contributions with freedom of speech. If the only "logic" a candidate can understand, or a contributor can express, is approval or disapproval of political positions by the giving or withholding of significant campaign funds, then money is their form of "argument". Moreover, insofar as a majority of voters confuses advertising with the logical presentation and scrutiny of political positions, and money is needed to increase advertising, then one can, in some stretch of logic, maintain that money is necessary for free speech even if it is not equated with it.
And a majority of the court, as of this writing, either think at least some of that is a reasonable form of argument or think they have to let it count as such to those who believe it. Even research scientists often misinterpret their data and don't have a good sense of what constitutes legitimate evidence. A current obsession in medical research in the United States is with random, double-blind, placebo-control trials as being the only good evidence even though there is good reason for other sorts of evidence being just as good and often more appropriate and ethically superior see, for example, A Perspective on the Ethics of Clinical Medical Research on Human Subjects or Smith, Gordon C S and Pell, Jill P.
Parachute use to prevent death and major trauma related to gravitational challenge: Part way through each term in my ethics courses, I get comments from some of them saying "Oh, you want us to think deeply about what is right in these cases, not just give a surface answer to get credit just for 'doing' the assignment", while others say "I just don't understand what you want.
None of this meaning the reasoning and the examples and analogies given in the explanations in the readings and in the discussions makes any sense to me. Often students will say they have read the material three or four times and they still don't understand anything. Upon questioning them, it will be clear they are right, that they don't understand anything. So I will then ask some probing questions to see what they understand, and the conversation typically goes something like this: Do you remember the example about the correctly convicted murderers on a train headed toward a school bus with 10 children on it.
Kind of, but I didn't understand it. There are rightly convicted murderers being transported by train to another prison. But a school bus with ten young students on it is stuck on the tracks. You can stop the train from hitting the bus only by switching it to run off a washed out bridge over a cliff. The engineer will be saved or is already dead, but he will not be killed with the murderers.
Likewise any prison guards. What should you do, save the people on the train or the kids on the bus? I guess I would save the children on the bus. Yes, isn't that what you should do? Okay, but what does that have to do with anything? Well that was one of the situations I gave to show that the principle of utilitarianism -- that you should always do what brings the greatest good to the greatest number of people -- is wrong.
And there were ten other different kinds of cases where it would also be wrong to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Do you see that? I'll go back and read that again and see what it says. Maybe I'll get it now.
But I just can't remember all this stuff. There is a lot there. But this is not about memorizing anything; I said that in the announcements. It is about understanding it as you read. You should see what the examples illustrate, and think about the principles they help show are right or wrong. Some are meant to show what is right about a principle; others are meant to show what is wrong with some principle. I didn't know that.