Social, economic, human rights and political challenges to global mental health
On 29 May , General Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in as the President of Nigeria. The Buhari-led administration is expected to urgently. We document a strong association between pre-colonial ethnic political centralization At the one extreme, there were states with centralized administration and . to petty chiefdoms are the Mende in Sierra Leone and the Ibo of Nigeria. .. of the effect of the African slave trades on trust (where they report “beta” coefficients. Relations between those who govern (today the politicians) and the administration have always been fraught with tension. This is illustrated by history : the ideal.
These patterns obtain both when the unit of analysis is the ethnic homeland and when we exploit the finer structure of the luminosity data to obtain multiple observations pixels for each homeland. Hence, although we do not have random assignment in ethnic institutions, the results clearly point out that traits manifested in differences in the pre-colonial institutional legacy matter crucially for contemporary African development.
Past and Present There was significant heterogeneity in political centralization across African ethnicities before colonization Murdock At the one extreme, there were states with centralized administration and hierarchical organization such as the Shongai Empire in Western Africa, the Luba kingdom in Central Africa, and the kingdoms of Buganda and Ankole in Eastern Africa.
At the other extreme, there were acephalous societies without political organization beyond the village level, such as the Nuer in Sudan or the Konkomba in Ghana and Togo.
- Social, economic, human rights and political challenges to global mental health
The middle of the spectrum occupied societies organized in large chiefdoms and loose alliances, such as the Ewe and the Wolof in Western Africa. While these societies lacked statehood, they tended to have conflict resolution mechanisms and a somewhat centralized decision making process Diamond The advent of the Europeans in Africa had limited impact on these pre-existing local political structures.
This was because colonization was with some exceptions quite limited both regarding timing and location Herbst Mamdani argues that, in fact, the European colonizers in several occasions strengthened tribal chiefs and kings via their doctrine of indirect rule.
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In the eve of African independence some countries attempted to limit the role of ethnic institutions; however, the inability of African states to provide public goods and broadcast power beyond the capitals, led African citizens to continue relying on the local ethnic-specific structures rather than the national government Englebert Herbstfor example, notes that in Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria and Chad while new states initially marginalized local chiefs, when they realized the extraordinary difficulties in governing rural areas, they quickly invited them back.
There is ample evidence pointing to the ongoing importance of ethnic-specific institutions. First, ethnic leaders and chiefs enjoy considerable support and popularity across local communities e. Second, both survey data and case studies show that local chiefs have significant power in allocating land rights. Analyzing data from the Afrobarometer Surveys, Logan documents that ethnic institutions are instrumental in assigning property rights and resolving disputes.
Third, in many countries local leaders collect taxes and provide some basic public goods e.
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Fourth, since the early s many countries 15 out of 39 according to Herbst have passed legislation or even constitutional amendments in the case of Uganda and Ghana formally recognizing the role of ethnic institutional structures in settling property rights disputes and enforcing customary law see Baldwin The African historiography has proposed various channels via which ethnic institutions shape contemporary economic activity.
First, Herbst and Boone argue that in centralized societies there is a high degree of accountability of local chiefs. For example, in ethnic groups that had a state structure, poorly-performing local rulers could be replaced by the king or superior administrators. Even nowadays some ethnic groups have assemblies and supreme officials that make local chiefs accountable.
Second, Diamond and Acemoglu and Robinson describe how ethnic groups that formed large states, had organized bureaucracies providing policing and other public goods. Third, in centralized ethnicities there was access to some formal legal resolution mechanism and some form or property rights steadily emerged Herbst Fourth, others have argued that centralized societies were quicker in adopting Western technologies, because the colonizers collaborated more strongly with politically complex ethnicities Schapera Fifth, tribal societies with strong political institutions have been more successful in getting concessions both from colonial powers and from national governments after independence.
For example, Acemoglu and Robinson describe how the Tswana leaders travelled from Bechuanaland current Botswana to England and convinced the British government to allow for a greater degree of autonomy.
The most closely related line of research is that of Gennaioli and Rainerwho present cross-country evidence showing that pre-colonial political centralization correlates positively with public goods provision and contemporary institutions. We advance this literature by establishing that, unlike other observable ethnicity-level variables, pre-colonial ethnic institutions captured by the degree of political complexity are systematically linked to contemporary regional development within countries as well as within pairs of contiguous ethnic homelands.
Our study also belongs to a growing body of work on the historical origins and the political economy of African development. Nunn stresses the importance of the slave trades, while HuilleryBerger and Arbesu quantify the long-run effects of colonial investments and tax collection systems.
Englebert, Tarango, and CarterAlesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou b examine the negative effects of the improper colonial border design during the Scramble for Africa.
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On a broader scale our work relates to the literature on the institutional origins of contemporary development see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson for a review. Our micro approach enables us to overcome problems inherent to the cross-country framework adding to a vibrant body of research that examines the within-country impact of various historical institutional arrangements e.
Nigeria's oil and natural gas resources are the mainstay of the country's economy. Map of Nigeria Source: Department of State Total primary energy consumption The U. This high share represents the use of biomass to meet off-grid heating and cooking needs, mainly in rural areas.
It's important to note that estimates of traditional biomass consumption are imprecise because biomass sources are not typically traded in easily observable commercial markets. International oil companies are concerned that proposed changes to fiscal terms may make some projects commercially unviable, particularly deepwater projects that involve greater capital spending.
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NNPC was created in to oversee the regulation of the country's oil and natural gas industry, with secondary responsibilities for upstream and downstream developments. Inthe NNPC was divided into 12 subsidiary companies to regulate the subsectors within the industry. PSC terms on deepwater projects tend to be more favorable to incentivize the development of deepwater projects.
Other companies active in Nigeria's oil and natural gas industry are Addax Petroleum, Statoil, and several Nigerian companies. IOCs participating in onshore and shallow water oil projects in the Niger Delta region have been affected by the instability in the region.
As a result, there has been a general trend for IOCs, particularly Shell, Total, Eni, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, to sell their interests in marginal onshore and shallow water oil fields, mostly to Nigerian companies and smaller IOCs, and to focus their investments on deepwater projects and onshore natural gas projects.
The Petroleum Industry Bill PIBwhich was initially proposed inis expected to change the organizational structure and fiscal terms governing the oil and natural gas industry if it becomes law. IOCs are concerned that proposed changes to fiscal terms may make some projects commercially unviable, particularly deepwater projects that involve greater capital spending.
Some of the most contentious areas of the various PIB drafts include: Regulatory uncertainty has resulted in fewer investments in new oil and natural gas projects, and no licensing round has occurred since The draft also proposed the creation of a Special Investigations Unit to curtail corruption.
The restructuring plan is not entirely clear, but the general plan is that NNPC will have five main divisions governing the upstream, downstream, midstream, refining, and venture groups. Rising security problems, coupled with regulatory uncertainty, have contributed to decreased exploration. Current exploration activities are mostly focused in the deep and ultra-deep offshore, although some onshore exploration is also taking place.
NNPC is exploring onshore in northeast Nigeria, within the Chad basin, despite the area's close proximity to the militant group Boko Haram.
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In lateNNPC announced a potential oil find in the Chad basin, but further studies are underway to assess the area. Nigeria does not currently produce any oil in the north, nor does northern Nigeria have the proper infrastructure to process or transport oil. In addition, instability caused by Boko Haram presents a substantial risk to producing oil in the area.
Exploration activities in the onshore Niger Delta in southern Nigeria have decreased because of the rising security problems related to oil theft and pipeline sabotage. Several major IOCs have divested from their onshore assets, which has created opportunity for local Nigerian companies to step in. The regulatory uncertainties surrounding the long-delayed PIB have also contributed to delayed investment in deepwater projects, and the start dates for these projects have continuously been pushed back.