Of course the individual has cognitive and semiotic functions, but these are people would use paper and pen or the calculators built into their iPhones; that is , the theoretical concept of dementia as disrupting the relationship between self . A system's density matrix can be written in the form you cite if and only if it is a classical mixture of factorisable pure states. A factorisable pure state is, of course, . Semiotics, it seems, has come a long way since the heyday of immanent or would seem to be the relationship between semiotics and cognitive science. .. proposed which together form a series of entangled strains of problem areas making.
Their power is not contained in their bodies, and everyone knows it. There is no space to grow, no thought of creating something better, no room for dancing, but only desire to fill an unmet need.
Instead of planning for growth and happiness, I dove blindfolded into relationships in a frenzied lust for fulfillment. I know this process intimately because I had no fulfillment in self and my life was littered with entanglements. I considered myself a hopeless romantic, and that is how I rationalized my behavior. But looking back, I see a clearer picture. I see a scared little boy who was frightened of the responsibility to be happy.
I see a frightened lad who put faith in everyone but himself. Welcome to the club. Feelings are so strong that they can make facts seem irrelevant. Have you continued to date a toxic person even though you fully understood they were no good for you? We kept coming back to each other even though the facts of our relationship were neon-warning signs. We displayed obvious patterns of cheating, emotional abuse, unhappiness and dissatisfaction, but what did that matter?
We smothered each other with for a lack of faith in ourselves and left no room for a relationship or growth. I cannot speak for her, but I will state my inner truth.
I settled for those pitiful feelings because I had no faith in a better way. I kept coming back to her because I was not supplying the thing I needed most for myself: Self love today is like being thirsty.
Instead of going to the well and taking a drink, people hop in the goddamned shower. Then they curse God for their parched throats. The irony of that inner need is that people generally look to fulfill it through external sources. I had no presence, and because I had no presence I had no gift to give.
Because I had no gift to give I made no room to grow, and because my entanglements had no room to grow, they always failed. Can you relate with any of this?
My entanglements fully embodied the spirit of our age: Do what makes you feel good, no matter what. I did what made me feel good, and my life fell into ruins. The only reason I changed is because my situation was drastic.
I lost my health, happiness, and sense of self. I put all of my power in others and had given away every shred of myself to the abyss. I had a choice: Find a better way or die. Become a supporter and enjoy The Good Men Project ad free When people are focused on creating and generating, they build space into their partnerships for dancing and expansion.What is a Healthy Relationship - The R Spot - Episode 10
When people are focused on creating and generating, they build space into their partnerships for dancing and expansion. But as far as I have seen, the majority of people are not looking to create a thing as much as they are seeking to fill a primary unmet need. The hell of it is, the need for fulfillment can only be satisfied by you. Your innermost needs cannot be met by anyone other than you. So how do you know if you are in a relationship or an entanglement?
Your relationship is actually an entanglement if: It keeps you from knowing and expressing your inner truth. It weighs you down and restricts your freedom. It has you making excuses for your partner or yourself. It disconnects you from your family and community. It distracts you from the creativity you want to share with the world.
It makes you question your self worth. You are insecure in it.
If you constantly blame your partner for the bad things in your life. Your power to change your station in life has been diminished in any way.
You felt strongly that they were the one, but it continues to worsen. You have established a pattern of breaking up and getting back together. When people become physically involved prematurely, powerful chemical feelings make the truth seem either inconsequential or inconvenient.
Strong feelings confuse what would otherwise be a simple matter. Entanglements are hard to avoid because they have mostly killed relationships. Look to the movies, magazines and tv. Everyone is tumbling off of the proverbial cliff in hot pursuit of a feeling. The operative word is: Simply enough, you must create the life you want. The key is to respond positively to your feelings, rather than allow them to drive your life. If you are a human, the beauty of other humans inspires you.
So you have a healthy sex drive? Inspiration is intrinsic with sex drive. If the drive of inspiration is natural and beautiful, then where does everything go to shit? Your response to your emotions determines your fate. Beyond the Classification of the Sciences 21The most neutral way of looking at semiotics is as a tradition consisting of problems posed and solution proposed which together form a series of entangled strains of problem areas making up a continuous discussion running through the centuries Cf.
Philosophy is made up of such tangles, and now and then some part of such a tangle is taken out of the mesh and made into its own particular strain, which is then called a science or a discipline. From an epistemological point of view, nothing changes. This research tradition would still be characterized by its peculiar point of view. It would be much more like a discussion: In the following, when I talk about semiotics as a science, it should be understood in this sense.
Indeed, I would like to claim that a science is simply a research tradition, in the above-defined sense, which has been institutionalized within society Sonesson This would also seem to be the point of view taken by Bordron and Eraly this volume.
It must not follow, however, that the division of the sciences is entirely arbitrary. The Division of Sciences as the Division of the World 22So far, I have tried to characterise complex notions such as method, model, movements, and so on, in very simple terms, sufficient to rule out the possibility of semiotics being one of those things.
Now we face the even more daunting task of trying to determine what a science is. As a first approximation, one may want to say that a science is a particularly orderly and systematic fashion for describing and analysing or, more generally, interpreting a certain part of reality, using different methods and models.
At this point we may want to introduce a division between natural sciences, on the one hand, and social and human or, better, semiotic sciences, on the other, which, following a traditional hermeneutical conception echoed by Eco, separates the interpretation of facts from the interpretation of interpretations.
Normally, it is added that the first kind of knowledge involves phenomena for which laws may be formulated, while the second kind only refer to unique occurrences; and that while the second type may be understood, the first can only be explained. As we will see, this is largely a pre-semiotic conception. Social phenomena may be separated from psychic phenomena, but at some point they will inevitably overlap. And yet it makes sense to say that there are central phenomena which are specifically social or psychic.
It might be said that there really is only one world, in which everything is continuous, although there may be clusters of characteristic properties forming prototypes, which slowly fade into other characteristic properties.
If the hermeneutic view propounded by Eco is correct and I think it is, at least to some extentthere are really two worlds, however: And if we take a phenomenological standpoint, the world of interpretations is primary.
It is the Lifeworld, the world taken for granted. In this sense, all the human and social sciences are continuous, as is the world they study, and so are the natural sciences, although their continuity is such in reference to another world, the constructed world of the natural sciences.
Ecological physics is part of the Lifeworld; physics as a science is part of the other world. French structuralism tended to interpret Saussure in a positivist manner, when saying, for instance, that it is the point of view which creates the object.
On the contrary, he wanted to fix the attention of linguistics on the central cluster of linguistic properties. One may argue that he failed to do so in a proper way, as Chomsky more unambiguously failed to do later on. But that does not mean he set the task wrongly.
The same applies to semiotics in general. There certainly are specifically semiotic phenomena. Whether they deserve a discipline of their own is a different matter. It is essentially a matter decided by society at large 2.
The Division of Sciences as the Division of Points of View 25But there is something seriously wrong with this analysis, even at its earliest stage. Not all sciences appear to have their own reserved piece of reality to study.
It seems to me that sciences may be defined either as being preoccupied with a particular domain of reality, or as applying a particular point of view to the whole of reality which is really one and the same.
Thus, French studies are involved with French language and literature, linguistics with all languages or what is common to all languages ; similarly, the history of religions describes a very particular domain of reality, religion, as it evolves through history and pre-history. Even within the natural sciences, there are some sciences that have their particular domains, such as geography, astronomy, and meteorology. This seems to be even more obviously true of such applied sciences as medicine and dentistry.
We find the same thing in the natural sciences: This is not the whole truth: So the point-of-view approach is supplemented by a domain-approach. The domain of chemistry and physics is much wider: But both apply the same point of view to the human world and what lies behind it, which is impossible for semiotics, as well as for psychology and sociology.
Contrary to chemistry and physics, biology is not just another point of view, but it is also domain-specific: This may explain that there is now such a speciality as biosemiotics but not at least I hope so chemical semiotics. This point of view consists, in Saussurean terms, in an investigation of the point of view itself, which is equivalent, in Peircean terms, to the study of mediation. This is at least the way I have formulated the task of semiotics in my earlier work. For many reasons which have been clear with the emergence of cognitive science and biosemioticsit now seems impossible to limit semiotics only to the way the human world is endowed with meaning.
Even when discussing pictures, which are peculiar to human beings, we can only understand their specificity in contrast to meanings handled by other animals. It will therefore be better to avoid any kind of belief-predicates in the characterization of semiotics. Yet the point, which is a standpoint, matters more than the sense modality. For, in studying these phenomena, semiotics should occupy the standpoint of humankind itself and of its different fractions.
Analogously, it has been argued that we should have to adapt the point of view of the bat, let alone the tick, but it is not clear that this can be done in the same sense. But it does not follow, as Prieto a would claim, that we must restrict our study to the knowledge shared by all users of the system, for it is necessary to descend at least one level of analysis below the ultimate level of which the user is aware, in order to take account of the presuppositions underlying the use of the system.
Semiotics must go beyond the standpoint of the user, to explain the workings of such operative, albeit tacit, knowledge that underlies the behaviour constitutive of any system of signification cf. This is to say that, pictorial semiotics, like all semiotic sciences, including linguistics, is a nomothetic science, a science which is concerned with generalities, not an idiographic science, comparable to art history and most other traditional human sciences, which take as their object an array of singular phenomena, the common nature and connectedness of which they take for granted.
I would like to insist on this combination here, since it overrides the traditional divide between the humanities and other sciences, postulated by the hermeneutical tradition from Dilthey and Weber to Habermas and Apel: Just like linguistics, but contrary to the natural sciences and to some varieties of the social sciences, all semiotic sciences are concerned with qualities, rather than quantities — that is, they are concerned with categories more than numbers.
Thus, semiotics shares with the social and natural sciences the character of being a law-seeking, or nomothetic, rather than an idiographic, science, while retaining the emphasis on categories, to the detriment of amounts, which is peculiar to the human sciences.
Being nomothetic and qualitative, pictorial semiotics has as its principal theme a category that may be termed pictoriality, or picturehood — which is a peculiar version of iconicity 3.
In this sense, semiotics is certainly a science. This, however, is all he has to say about semiotics. The bulk of the text is taken up by a much more classical discussion: Cassirer has learnt the lesson of the Prague school well: Phonology, then, and the whole of linguistics, is a Geisteswissenschaft.
Nowadays, it may be added that, as linguistics has now been generalized to a series of particular semiotical sciences, such as pictorial semiotics, gesture studies, cultural semiotics, and so on, the result of neglecting these domains of study in the theory of knowledge are even more dire.
In fact, many of these thinkers as is also true of Dilthey attribute much importance to language in other respects as does, for instance Habermas, with his ideal speech situationand yet they do not take the peculiarities of the semiotic sciences into account. They fail to realize that linguistics, and other semiotical sciences conducted on this model, do not really correspond to either the description of the natural or the cultural sciences.
In another publication, which is specifically dedicated to the study of the nature of the cultural sciences, Cassirer63ff takes exception to the simplistic opposition usually proposed between the natural and cultural sciences, claiming that general concepts are needed also in the latter.
Whether linguistics is concerned with universals of language mentioned by Cassirer83, with reference to Jakobsonor it simply has the aim of formulating the phonological, grammatical and semantical rules of a given language, it is involved with something general, not with individual facts. But even in the pioneering days of Grimm and Paul, historical linguistics was very much dedicated to formulating rules of language change. That is why art history is not pictorial semiotics.
They are not nomothetic, he says, because in the cultural sciences, individual phenomena cannot be deduced from general laws. And they are not ideographic, because they cannot be reduced to history.
This is of course the distinction I have tried to account for in distinguishing the nomothetic and qualitative sciences of semiosis from the nomothetic and quantitative sciences of nature. On the Way to Cognitive Semiotics 36To say that something becomes a science because of social reasons is not to suggest that those reasons are necessarily superficial, the result of power games and nepotism. In the case of semiotics, it may simply be the case that semiotics has so far failed to demonstrate its usefulness to wider groups within society.
However, society as such is certainly also at stake: People in the latter part of the world would no doubt tend to think that this is so because Latin culture is more susceptible to intellectual fads.
There may be some truth in this, if semiotics is identified with intellectual fashion statements such as structuralism, post-structuralism, and post-modernism. But this is a very limited, and uninteresting, way of looking at semiotics. Meta-analyses in our Time: Like semiotics, cognitive science is often conceived as an interdisciplinary perspective that sometimes no doubt more often than semiotics has gained the position of an independent discipline.
Curiously, it might be argued that cognitive science and semiotics cover more or less the same domain of knowledge — or rather, to apply the observations made above, take a very similar point of view on the world.
This in itself is controversial, since semiotics and cognitive science offer very different characterizations of their domain or, strictly speaking, the point of view taken on the domain. In some sense, however, both are concerned with the way in which the world described by the natural sciences appears to humans beings and perhaps also to other animals and some robots.
Indeed, in an earlier phase, cognitive science seemed more susceptible of being described by a simple model: At present, however, even cognitive science has several models, one of which could be described as involving the mind as brain.
Cognitive science is often described as the result of joining together the knowledge base of rather disparate empirical disciplines such as linguistics, cognitive psychology, philosophy, biology, and computer science. Thus, instead of one research tradition connected through the ages, cognitive science represents a very recent intermingling of several research-traditions having developed separately until a few decades ago.
Semiotics has, in a more classical way, developed out of the amorphous mass of philosophy, and still has some problems encountering its empirical basis.
It might be suggested that the basic concept of semiotics is the sign, whereas that of cognitive science is representation — even though there is a long tradition in semiotics for rejecting the sign concept, and recent cognitive science has marked its distances to the notion of representation 4. These differences partly may explain why semiotics and cognitive science rarely are on speaking terms.
They may also explain why cognitive science has had so much more institutional success than semiotics: Cognitive science can be practiced, and indeed has historically been practiced, from very different points of views. Indeed, the fact that mental life could be simulated on a computer was supposed to show that mental notions could be dispensed with altogether.
Consciousness was, in this view, not in any way more difficult to explain than the possibility of having snippets of code making the same kind of calculations as the human brain.
Too much should not be made of these notions, however, because, as mentioned above, they apply to computers as well as to human beings. It is no doubt true that they served to bring inspirations from phenomenology and other traditions involved with consciousness into the fold of cognitive science, which is in itself a remarkable feat, if we remember that, before that, many phenomenologists, such as most famously Hubert Dreyfus, and a notable representative of the British style of the philosophy of mind such as John Searle, were violently opposed to cognitive science.
However, both situatedness and embodiment can be given — and have been given — other, more mechanistic, interpretations. The preoccupations with notions such as agency, intentions, consciousness, empathy, intersubjectivity, etc. In fact, these notions are anathema to much of cognitive science, both in its classical version and, in a more implicit and confused way, in what nowadays may be described as mainstream cognitive science, associated with the work of Lakoff and Johnson, Dennett, Fodor, etc.
The body which forms the context is not the body as lived, that is, as a meaning, but the body as studied in the neurosciences. Lakoff, Johnson, Rohrer, and their likes today form the core of what is meant by mainstream cognitive science. Although their work is extremely confused and contradictory as shown most clearly by Haserand even though it contains superficial references to part of the phenomenological tradition, a close reading of, in particular, their most recent publications, shows that in actual fact, they are back at a conception identical in practice to that of classical cognitive science, with the brain being substituted for the computer.
As soon as they get down to business, the body they are talking about is reduced to the neurons and synapses of the brain. Thus, embodiment, in this tradition is certainly not part of context. This is also true if their work is interpreted in terms of the kind of influence they have had. At least prototypically, or as a goal state, it involves rational operations, such as those that are characteristic of argumentation or problem solving. Unlike most of the venerable semiotic tradition, I have always argued against the autonomy postulate, basing my own work to a large measure on an interpretation of experimental results most notably in Sonesson In that sense, without using the term, I consider myself to be one of the initiators of cognitive semiotics.
What cognitive science needs, however, is to take into account even more research traditions, one of which is no doubt semiotics. However, meta-analysis taking a semiotic as well as a cognitive point of view might perhaps better be called semiotics. In the end, there may be no meaning without cognition, and no cognition without meaning, at least given the wide definition of cognition characteristic of cognitive science. It might perhaps be said that semiotics differs from cognitive science simply by putting the emphasis on meaning rather than cognition.
Cognitive Semiotics as a New Paradigm 44Cognitive semiotics — or, perhaps better, semiotic cognitive science, as Terrence Deacon has suggested only orally, I believe —, which aims to bring together the knowledge base and models of cognitive science and semiotics, seems to have been invented several times over, probably because it is needed. What seems to be lacking, most of the time, in semiotics, is real empirical research.
What is severely missing in cognitive science is a conception of meaning. But it is also the kind of cognitive science which continues the tradition of cognitive psychology from Bartlett to Neisser.
It is the kind of cognitive science which also relies on experiment. The most obvious reason for this is, as we saw, that semiotics, if it is not erroneously identified with French structuralism, can be seen to have been using many different models and methods, as well as being practiced from different philosophical points of view. It is interdisciplinary and meta-analytical with a twist, because it takes meaning as its perspective on the world.
Terrence Deacon is a researcher in neuroscience whose work has been particularly acclaimed within cognitive science. Yet he has chosen to express some of his main arguments in a terminology taken over from Peirce, who is perhaps the principal cultural hero of semiotics 7. It seems to apply even more to Tomaselloless, in the end, because of his epigraphs taken from classical semioticians such as Peirce and Mead as well as Bakhtin and Vygotsky, than because of the general thrust of his analysis, which consists in separating true instances of interpreting actions as intentional from those which may merely appear to be such.
His main argument for having recourse to cognitive science, however, seems somewhat confused to me: The latter, contrary to the former, makes use of semiosis in the most central sense of the term: In meaning and cognition in the very general sense of cognitive science are connected, than semiotics and cognitive science, as we suggested above, may simply be different emphasis attributed to the same field of study.
But this is a point of view which cannot be sustained. However, as we saw above, it would be even more natural to conclude that, just as sociology, psychology, archaeology, literary history, and so on, semiotics can be practiced from the point of view of different philosophical conceptions. The kind of semiotics which I propose, which would permit us to organize an encounter with cognitive science of the consciousness studies brand, in particular, is a decidedly phenomenological and empirical semiotics.
However, by using such a term as cognitive semiotics, I am clearly implying that semiotics it not just any tradition worthy of taking into account in a reformed cognitive science. Such a term clearly involves taking for granted that meaning is the primary issue of human beings and, beyond that, of all life-forms.
From the point of view of semiotics, cognitive semiotics is rather a perspective from which semiotics may be elaborated. Without semiotics, cognitive science is not complete. As Peirce said, we have to get out of the philosophical soup shops.
Relationships and Entanglements: Do You Know the Difference? - The Good Men Project
Let us now turn to consider some of philosophical residue left in the tureen. On Phenomenology and its Naturalization 52Just like French structuralism was semiotics with a particular epistemological slant, cognitive science so far often has been a study of cognition equipped with a particular epistemology.
Basically, French structuralism was characterized by a positivistic conception of the world and of scientific method, taken over less from Saussure than coming out the subsequent development of linguistics prior to the advent of Chomsky and forming the background of distributionalism and behaviourism. As all French intellectual fads at the time, Structuralism in this sense obviously also had to take Freud and Marx into account, which could only be done by tempering the positivist conception, or rather, concomitantly rendering it rigid and inoperant.
Something which is less well-known, however, is that Structuralism, appearing on the French intellectual scene, also had to define itself in relation to Husserlean phenomenology, at least in its French, subjectivist, variety, known as Existentialism.