Stosunki antagonistyczne amensalism relationship

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Tuka and Mach, along with the entire radical wing of the government, backed this proposal Kamenec— The plan was outlined by Mach, who confirmed that approximately 15, young men and women aged sixteen to thirty-five would be deported, with more following once new settlements had been constructed Kamenec The fourteenth department of the Ministry of the Interior implemented the deportations. This not only helped to ensure their powerful position in the state, but also gave them the opportunity to enrich themselves from the pilfered and ill-guarded property of the deported Kamenec Each train was to comprise twenty-five goods trucks, each with a capacity for forty persons, while luggage would be taken in a further two wagons.

In addition, a police escort would travel in one wagon with a Jewish doctor. However, these regulations and standards were not met. On 11 MarchMinistry of Transport and Public Works declared that the Da David transport was ready, immediately after which, and in cooperation with the relevant German authorities, the ministry prepared a timetable for the transports Kamenec In total 26, people passed through the camp, living in wooden huts and sleeping on wooden plank beds.

They were there for only a few days, after which they were deported to death camps in the German-occupied Poland the General Government. According to the official records, 12, Jews were transported to Auschwitz, 11, to Treblinka and 2, to Lublin.

The Ministry of Interior ordered the district, legal and municipal authorities to prepare a list of Jewish citizens with the assistance of the HG and FS. According to a decree issued by the ministry on 12 FebruaryJews were listed in three categories: All Jews in general, regardless of gender, age, nationality and employment except those granted an exemption 2.

Male Jews aged sixteen to sixty regardless of inability to work 3. Men aged over sixty years and women over sixteen, who are employed. According to this request, Jews in all the villages and towns in the district were to be registered.

The ministry ordered the regional and district offices to prepare a list of Jewish real estate they owned freehold by 10 March Their property was categorized under fourteen headings: Some items were immediately confiscated and subsequently sold at auction.

They included widows, single and divorced women unless they had children under the age of sixteen years aged sixteen to forty-five. Hence, twenty-two women were not transported because they were baptized, too ill or unable to work.

The relevant authorities received the following instruction: By the end of the month, a further two transports had been scheduled, and were due to take place on 24 and 28 March. Between April and Augustthree more transports left the town.

We learn from this letter that — Jews were to be transported in six wagons, so three police officers and nine guardsmen would be needed to accompany them to prevent desertions, while at least a two-member guard was to travel in each wagon.

They also had to ensure that evacuated households and farms owned by Jews were closed and listed. The first train was to leave on 7 June at 1: According to a Ministry of Interior decree dated 16 AprilJewish inhabitants could each take luggage weighing up to 50 kg. He was transported with his wife. Nine men, six women and seven children one of whom was three months old were deported. In this case there were no exemptions, even if the wives were Aryan or the children had been baptized.

The original governmental draft law, which was sent by the Ministry of Interior in Marchwas not debated. Protection of certain groups of Jewish inhabitants from the deportations was the main goal of reworking the draft law. Parki Narodowe i Rezerwaty Przyrody 23 3: Red list of threatened species in the Czech Republic.


On the occurrence of Cordulegaster boltonii Donovan, Odonata: Cordulegastridae in western part of the Lithuanian Lake District Poland. Zoology and Ecology 22 3—4: Parki Narodowe i Rezerwaty Przyrody 21 2: Parki Narodowe i Rezerwaty Przyrody 21 3: Parki Narodowe i Rezerwaty Przyrody 26 2: Biodiversity hot spot and important refugium of the potamocoen?

Katalog fauny Polski 23 4: Scarabaeoidea, Dascilloidea, Byrrhoidea i Parnoidea. Katalog Fauny Polski 23 9: Buprestoidea, Elateroidea i Cantharoidea. Katalog Fauny Polski 23 Gyrinidae Coleoptera of the lakes: The seasonal dynamics and notes about their phenology.

Acta Univiversitatis Nicolai Copernici, Biol. Thesis, Pedagogical University of Vilnius, Vilnius mscr. Red Lists for Europe. It allows for processes of social inclusion and exclusion by which the constituen cy is assigned see Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke and Tambini There are, however, different procedures involved in setting the community apart from others and thus making it an object of legitimate rights.

The specificity of a territorially based political entity consists in the nature of the collective identity by which the commu nity is integrated and endowed with an inevitable sense of stability. This integration is secured by classifying codes which structure the perception of social reality assigning critical impor tance to the notion of contested sovereignty in salient political conflicts. The charac ter of such a 4 We operate with the concept of political opportunity structures which, according to Tarrowcan be understood as consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics.

Gamson and Wolfsfeld ; Koopmans and Statham The particular codes upon which the collective identity is based provide the political movement or institution with critical resources in mobilizing their assigned constituency.

These codes determine the range in which political goals can be conceived and issues politi cized without contesting the overall integrating collective identi ty. Here it is again necessary to underline that the formation of a politicized collective identity is an explicit challenge to the dominant cultural order in this case the estab lished national ones.

Hence, it determines how people locate their claims in an accordingly defined socio-cultural system as well as how they allocate their loyalties and resourc es. In this respect it proves instructive to make use of Eisen stadt s basic distinction between universali stic and primordial forms of collective identity, each reflecting some principal fea tures regarding its mecha nisms of integration and its relation to the external environ ment 6.

The first of these ideal types is the primor di al one [41]. It is based upon codes and rituals seeking to emphasize the supposedly natural givenness of a territorial commu nity 7 and demarcating an unalterable dif ference between Us and Them. The claimed unique ness of its own collectivity defines its relationship with the outer world.

Primordial codes obviously link the con stitutive differ ence to original and un changeable distinctions which are by social defini tion exempt ed from com munication and exchange. In order to protect the internal stability of such an identity, the procedures of crossing the bound aries between the inner and outer dominion have to be strictly formulated and are normal ly charac terized by insurmountable barriers.


Primordial forms of collective identi ty seek to rigorously regu late contact with the outside world to protect the intrinsic value of their culture from pollution or dilution. The inte gration of the community is secured by exclusive practices built upon a rigid demarcation of Us and Them.

This type of coding a collective identity tends to stress the ethnic unique ness of their respec tive community by historical narra tives and symbolic practic es. By doing so, they seek to underline the ne cessity that birth into their community and the natural acquisi tion of the indigenous identity is the only valid prerequi site to belonging to the territorially demarcat ed collectiv ity.

At the level of the individual those features of belonging are perceived as natural and given by birth into the community. The self-presentation of the col- 6 The basic theoretical distinctions and related conceptual tool are developed in: In fact, the foreigner is considered to be a genuine threat to the community by his or her otherness. He is perceived as jeopardizing and spoiling the purity of the primordial community. A critical integrative mechanism of this type of collec tive identity is the image of being under the constant peril of overpowering outside pressure.

The second type of collective identity is integrated by universalistic patterns of identifica tion. The orienta tions of this way of demarcating the boundaries between the we and the them is potentially universal istic. The virtues that are said to be the defining criteria for belonging to the indige nous community are not bound to a strictly defined ethnic criteria or cultural endowments which are categorically given by descent. The boundaries between We and Non-We are cross able through adaptation and compliance to fluid cultural stan dards of inclusion.

Based on a notion of superior i ty of the territorially defined community, the bound aries for foreigners are in principle open as long as he is willing to adapt to the mostly implicit rules of the game.

This type of collective identity explicitly invites people to conv ert by the help of education and cultur al assimilation. Outsiders are considered as inferior beings requi ring cultural formation and identi ty. It is in fact integral to this type of collective identity that it develops a sense of missionary atti tude, presenting its own societal order as a superior, albeit universally appli cable societal mod el.

The subsequent empirical analysis will investigate what form of collective identity is employed in the recent mobilization in favor of Scottish independence.

The underlying theoretical assumption is that the mode to defining the regional-national identity of Scotland sets the framework within which political aspirations are developed and the nature of the Scottish political community is defined.

The political-institutional context for the referendum in Scotland The decision of certain political and civil society actors in Scotland in recent years to employ a referendum to secure independence is significant both in terms of the stability of the wider Spanish and British states and their success or inability at accommodating the ambitions of Scottish nationalism, as well as in terms of the political strategies of the Scottish pro-independence movements.

The first issue speaks to broader questions regarding strategies for maintaining the stability of multinational polities. Is it more effective to accede to the demands of minority nationalists for greater autonomy and political recognition in the interests of preserving the unity of the larger multinational polity to the 16 17 Public Policy and Economic Development point of accepting asymmetrical federal or confederal political arrangements or is it better to refuse minority nationalist demands on the grounds that greater decentralization will only encourage aspirations for secession?

This question has provoked considerable academic debate in recent years among scholars of multinational polities. Will Kymlicka [34, p. Wayne Norman articulates a similar point when he explains the unforeseen challenges of officially recognizing a minority nation within a larger multinational state including the minority nation s right to self-determination. He argues that recognizing of a minority nation might make the members of the group feel more at home in a state that no longer pretends that they do not exist, but that it also might strengthen the national identity of the members of that group, and thereby weaken their attachment to the larger state thus encouraging secession [36, p.

Michael Keating b agrees that accommodating minority nationalist demands can have unforeseen consequences, but cautions that the prospect of it leading to secession is not as likely. Rather he contends that recognizing a minority nation s right to self-determination will not necessarily lead to that nation seceding from its larger multinational polity, as the costs of secession militate strongly against this, and argues that secession is more likely in conditions in which the right to self-determination is denied, thus forcing nationalists into more extreme postures [26, p.

This choice between accommodating or resisting the self-government and recognition demands of minority nationalists has underlined the British and Spanish debates surrounding political devolution in recent decades, and reappeared in discussions over granting the Scottish government the necessary powers to hold referendums on independence.

The British strategy of agreeing to negotiate with the Scottish National Party through the Edinburgh Agreement over granting Scotland the authority to hold an independence referendum, agreeing to abide by the result of the vote, as well as promising the Scottish people greater devolution in return for voting No and remaining within the 8 While Kymlicka referred to multinational federal states, his argument could also apply to multinational devolved unitary states such as the United Kingdom and Spain, in which opponents of political devolution have characterized greater autonomy for Scotland and Catalonia as merely a stepping-stone on the path to their eventual independence.

The British government appears to recognize and affirm Scotland s national status and right of self-determination, and have attempted to prevent Scotland from declaring independence by granting it greater political autonomy within the British state. Indeed, it is a fascinating question yet one beyond the scope of this article to inquire whether since the initiation of devolution in the UK under the government of Tony Blair there has been a gradual build-up of Scottish government competence and institutional capacity that has allowed for a push for a referendum.

This has created opportunities for interest formation and articulation that, as I will show in a moment, have contributed to the push for independence by the nationalists. Supporters of independence consist of a broad coalition of political and civil society actors. Yet in drive for Scottish independence also relies on the leadership and organizational drive for the referendum came from the Scottish National Party SNP under the leadership of Alex Salmond.

In the Scottish parliamentary election, the SNP gained a majority, which it interpreted as a mandate to hold an independence referendum.

Interspecific and Intraspecific Competition

In its efforts, the SNP found allies in other parties and non-party proponents of independence most notable the Scottish Independence Convention, a broad-based centre-left umbrella organization promoting a referendum and high-profile artists, actors and intellectuals.

Regardless of this broad coalition the SNP was clearly the driving force behind the referendum; its organizational and ideological commitment to independence put it into a widely accepted leadership role. Framing the vision of an independent nation Independence and the referendum process for achieving independence have been framed and justified by Scottish actors in a multitude of ways, drawing on: This point speaks to a historically rooted sense of inferiority of Scots towards Great Britain.

Even in the speeches and declarations of pro-independence proponents there is a recognition of the historic achievements of Great Britain, some of which they promise to protect and nurture within an independent Scotland indeed the Better Together campaign mocked Scottish nationalists idea of combining the best of two worlds and that relatively little would change in terms of some of the British traditions including allegiance to the Monarchy.

The rationale of transferring competence in key policy areas to the then newly established Scottish Parliament at Holyrood was to allow for a greater sense of political ownership over political decisions affecting the region. Yet, arguably, one can contend that, as some critics feared, devolution has fueled the appetite and provided resources to pursue an even greater degree of home-rule.

In his speeches, Alex Salmond repeatedly characterizes independence as not just as an end in itself. In the political framing strategy of the Yes Campaign the goal of independence is intimately tied to the aspirations of the Scottish people and the unfulfilled potential of a truly self-ruling Scotland.

The SNP election manifesto that put the plea for independence at its core provide a good sense of how the resulting campaign leading up to the vote is justified. The manifesto speaks of a: In our approach to government this will see more power devolved to local communities and greater involvement for people in the decisions that most affect the place they live. This theme of empowerment for our communities runs like a thread through our policy platform.

Commentators such as Charles King contrast the kilt-and-bagpipes version of Scottishness with one that is essentially grounded in social and political values see more on this point in the next section. The focus of the nationalist campaign is hardly on any ethno-cultural differences or even historic grievances 11 ; even the collective memory of a supposedly glorious past as promoted by Scottish nationalists well into the s has largely ended.

In its place, the framing of the pro-independence cause is driven by the demand for proper political institutions and claims of self-governance. Scottish nationalists are extremely careful when it comes to exploiting the simple Us versus Them binary employed in traditional nationalist reasoning. Moreover, the rationale for doing so can be found in a peculiar social reality when it comes to defining modes of collective belonging and identity.

According to a study conducted by Carman, Johns and Mitchellmost voters in Scotland would describe their identity as a mix of Scottish and British elements. While there is a strong recognition of an independent sense of being Scottish, it is not primarily defined as non-british. Indeed the British and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey found that symbols of British culture are similarly endorsed in England and in Scotland most prominently those of democracy, the monarchy, and a sense of fair play.

The claim that Scotland is unable to articulate its interests and values is couched in two framing strategies. The first strategy links the issue of Scottish independence with a general feeling of disengagement from mainstream politics. The Yes campaign portrays people in Scotland as marginalized and voiceless; and it blames the UK Westminster system to be the root cause for this marginalization. With this strategy, the Yes campaign seeks to 11 In terms of references to history it is remarkable that historic grievances since the vote for merger between England and Scotland in do not figure prominently in the framing of the Yes campaign.

Virtually no reference is made to the historic predecessors of the fight for independence such as the Highland clans, the Scottish Free Church Movement or the Glasgow dockworkers in the post-war period. In this narrative Scottish independence is depicted as a fundamental decision on the rules under which citizens engage politically and have a say in the collective fate of the community.

The second framing strategy is more narrowly focused on the British political system. For Scottish nationalists, British politics suffers from a structural underrepresentation of Scottish interests in London. Repeatedly the Yes campaign pointed to the fact that in post-war Britain Scotland regularly lived under UK governments that it did not vote for, and the SNP could claim that it is highly unlikely that it will be able to represent Scottish interests in any future UK government.

The current political configuration in Westminster, in which only one of the Conservative MPs comes from Scotland, also served as an example of Scottish under-representation and disconnect from the U.

Again, the Yes campaign depicts London rule as a form of suffocating conservatism. The central reference point in the Yes campaign is Scotland s alienation from Tory-governed England and the claim that only far-reaching self-government can put an end to foreign rule resulting from Scotland s peripheral role in the Westminster system. According to their reading of recent British history, the legacy of Margaret Thatcher has pushed the UK s major parties so far to the right that the more progressive Scottish society and political elite feel alienated from the rest of Britain.

The Thatcher years are vividly depicted as an onslaught against the progressive values of Scotland and the achievements of the post-war British welfare state pensions, medical care, public housing, higher education, etc. The former Prime Minister has become the epitome of non-scottishness. Again, Thatcher is not depicted as the ethnocultural other but as the representative of a way of organizing the political community that is deemed alien to the values widely held in Scotland. These sentiments are primarily directed at the British Conservatives but include the Labour Party.

During the referendum campaign, Labour was depicted as a party firmly rooted in the Westminster system that translated British priorities into the Scottish context without proper sensitivities to regional needs. The fact that all three mainstream British parties joined in the Better Together campaign helped to paint a picture of British parties as being hostile to Scottish home-rule regardless of their ideological perspectives. In addition, the rise of UKIP as a populist anti-immigration, anti-eu party during the campaign gave 21 22 Issue 5 9 additional arguments to the pro-independence advocates to depict the goal of a fair and harmonious society as being increasingly incompatible with the direction of British politics.

Scottish nationalists have made the protection of welfare state provisions the cornerstone of their campaigns. These frames resonated strongly with the Scottish electorate: However, in its campaign the proindependence camp faced the challenge of having to reconcile its commitment to expansive welfare state provisions with its separate commitment to keeping an independent Scotland economically competitive in a globalizing world.

Clearly, the reliance on revenues from natural resource extraction most notably North Sea oil was a critical element in this regard.